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 11 
The traditional dominance of Western nations in global governance is being increasingly 12 
counter-balanced by the rise of Asia, whose nations’ growing economic power and distinctive 13 
values, principles and strategies of international engagement may unsettle existing 14 
understandings of the processes, practices, and prospects for policy-making across borders. As 15 
Bice and Sullivan (2014) note, the ‘Asian Century’ is one amongst many manifestations of the 16 
globalisation phenomenon regularly identified. However, far from observing the erosion of 17 
national political borders and state capacity as proxies for globalisation, studies of international 18 
policy coordination in Asia have consistently observed a strong assertion and recognition of 19 
sovereignty at the nation state-level as a central and defining feature. In terms of international 20 
policy coordination, national sovereignty claims are expressed in norms of non-interference in 21 
internal affairs by global governance actors, a typical preference for international agreements 22 
that are non-binding and lack legal force as well as declarations that do not commit resources. 23 
 24 
As a corollary, the general argument is advanced that such tightly held claims of nation state 25 
sovereignty in Asia limit international policy coordination. In dealing with the policy problems 26 
of growing economic interdependence and policy spillover effects across borders, assertions of 27 
nation state sovereignty is are argued, in many policy sectors, to cut into the options available 28 
for the effective implementation of international governing arrangements (for example, in 29 
health, see Stevenson and Cooper 2009, Fidler 2012). Ultimately, the arguments runs, 30 
successful international policy coordination relies on undermining national sovereignty and the 31 
development of strong, formal institutions at the international level are necessary.  32 
 33 
In case study methods terms, Non-Communicable Diseases (NCD) policy is a typical case of 34 
international policy coordination in Asia; health is a policy sector where strong norms of 35 
national sovereignty tend to operate, and by hypothesis, these would be expected to act as a 36 
barrier to the development of effective governing arrangements for international policy 37 
coordination. Case allows us to explore the claim that national sovereignty limits the 38 
development of international governance for international policy coordination. It limits 39 
opportunities for innovation, proscribes certain options for coordination and precludes the 40 
establishment of hard, formal authority at the international level. The need for effective 41 
international policy coordination is manifest in the multiple disease patterns associated with 42 
globalization that cross-cross Asia, novel in the speed, intensity and directions of their 43 
pathways. Although the emergence of new infectious diseases in Asia are salient in global 44 
health agenda, the increasing burden of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) in poor and 45 
middle income Asian countries is the dominant epidemiological transition driven by 46 
globalisation. This is both a health challenge and development problem in Asia; 47 
macroeconomic effects of chronic poor health and preventable early deaths are significant in 48 
Asia and at the level of the household, NCDs may act as a barrier to exit from poverty. 49 
 50 
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The central argument of the chapter is that there is greater capacity for international policy 51 
coordination in Asia in health than implied in the claim that national sovereignty obstruct 52 
effective international policy coordination to protect public health. The argument is developed 53 
first conceptually through an understanding of relationships between formal and informal 54 
institutions in the governance arrangements for international policy coordination in Asia. Next 55 
the argument is illustrated by the NCD case of international policy coordination in terms of the 56 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the ability of Thailand, India, Malaysia 57 
and Singapore to develop informally health related interpretations of formal institutions in 58 
intellectual property rights for medicines.  The conclusion reflects on whether this is a health 59 
policy-only case or of more general relevance to thinking about international policy 60 
coordination in Asia.  61 
 62 
 63 
International policy coordination: two ideal types 64 
 65 
As a starting point for the analysis of governing arrangements for international policy 66 
coordination, Ginsberg (2010a; b) posits two ideal types: the first is some form of global 67 
constitutionalism, following the EU model of establishing supranational sovereignty, whilst 68 
the second is an emerging Eastphalia model constructed in terms of Westphalian sovereignty 69 
(see Krasner 2000 for discussion of mutual respect for the principle of non-interference in the 70 
affairs of another state and the formal equality of states). In an Eastphalia model, the 71 
commitment to state sovereignty is maintained alongside shallow and weakly institutionalised 72 
forms of mutual support and informal cooperation in international policy coordination that will 73 
be explored later in the chapter as the ‘ASEAN way’. 74 
 75 
There is nothing distinctively Asian about the concept of Eastphalia. For example, one could 76 
plausibly read UK government preferences towards the EU over the last thirty years up to the 77 
Brexit vote of June 2016 as exemplary Eastphalian. However, as Ginsburg (2010a; b) employs 78 
the term, it does help to highlight a countertendency to claims of a global constitutionalism 79 
driving developments in global governance in which the EU model, at least in ideal form, is 80 
the pioneer of establishing formal legal architectures above and beyond states (for example, 81 
Slaughter 2006). In the EU, sovereignty is pooled so that formal legal integration has been able 82 
to underpin a regional governance arrangements in which the European Court of Justice sits 83 
above, and supervenes upon, the policy preferences and actions of the EU member states. 84 
  85 
Without doubting the analytical value of imposing a dichotomy between global 86 
constitutionalism and Eastphalia for a macroscale consideration of new world orders, for the 87 
practical concerns of public policy and international policy coordination these two ideal types 88 
already coexist in practice: policy-making across borders in Asia is typically some mix of 89 
formal institutions of supranational authority and formal institutions of nation state 90 
sovereignty. This chapter explores how the effects of this mix of formal institutions on 91 
international policy coordination is mediated by a set of informal institutions. This chapter 92 
looks, empirically in terms of NCD policy, at the combination of these two types of formal 93 
institutions with coexisting informal institutions and what these may imply for international 94 
policy coordination in Asia  95 
 96 
Although elusive and difficult to reign in analytically, the notion of an ‘ASEAN style’ of 97 
international policy coordination is a useful starting point for describing the hybrid of formal 98 
and informal institutions that govern international policy coordination in Asia. At a minimum, 99 
Fidler (2012) argues it is a preference for non-interference in internal affairs by global 100 
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governance actors, for weak formal institutions and non-binding coordination solutions. It is a 101 
helpful term here by serving as a convenient label to contrast two policy coordination styles: 102 
an ASEAN way as opposed to a more formalised global governance system, characterised by 103 
trends such as increasing the legalisation of international trade and investment flows (Goldstein 104 
and Steinberg 2008). As Fidler (2012), building on Somers Heidhues (2000), argues: the 105 
ASEAN way is characterised by consensus building rather than discord; pragmatism rather 106 
than higher order principles; and gradualism rather that abrupt change. For our purposes in this 107 
chapter, it also includes the preference for elite level policy negotiations conducted through 108 
informal networks rather than formal and strongly institutionalised regional organizations.  109 
 110 
Once informality is recognised as a central feature in international policy coordination in Asia 111 
intertwined with the two types of formal institutions, we can state the core contribution of the 112 
chapter: investigating empirically the relationship between informal and formal institutions for 113 
international policy coordination in Asia. For example, although the ASEAN Free Trade 114 
Agreement (FTA) is weakly institutionalised, lacking an effective dispute resolution 115 
mechanism, ASEAN countries also participate regularly in the formal institutions of the WTO 116 
dispute settlement process. The ASEAN Regional Forum has developed as the main security 117 
structure for the region but as Ginsburg (2010a, p.865) argues, it is “…hardly institutionalized 118 
in the sense of its institutional structure having any independent effect on outcomes”. Rather, 119 
it is very much a Westphalian conception of discussions and relational, informal policy 120 
coordination. Yet ASEAN countries are also members of formal institutions within the UN 121 
system (Friedrichs 2012). 122 
 123 
This chapter uses the case of NCD policy to explore the different institutional factors that may 124 
shape, constrain and enable the strategies of Asian countries in international policy 125 
coordination. Four pivotal relationships between formal and informal institutions are identified 126 
to help characterise distinctively Asian features of international policy coordination. The 127 
chapter will discuss the role of Asian nations in international coordination of NCD prevention 128 
policy. This can be divided a priori into two sub-cases: (a) tobacco. The development the 129 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has been frequently observed as a case of 130 
‘binding’ international policy coordination; (b) other commodities. The regulation of the 131 
consumption of other commodities which are NCD risk factors, in particular alcohol and ultra-132 
processed food, have conventionally been contrasted as a case of strong national sovereignty 133 
claims and relatively ineffective international policy coordination. These are employed in the 134 
chapter as illustrative cases of the different ways in which Asian nations might exert their 135 
leadership and influence across formal and informal institutions of international policy 136 
coordination in the coming decades. 137 
 138 
 139 
Informal and formal institutions: relationships and interactions in international policy 140 
coordination in Asia 141 
 142 
The key concept that this chapter seeks to reconsider and recast in terms of policy coordination 143 
in Asia is informality in institutional design and practice. The case studies in international 144 
health policy reveal different informal institutions, and their relationship to different formal 145 
institutions, as key aspects of governing international policy across Asia. Informality in 146 
international governance in Asia is most regularly asserted as a set of distinctly Asian norms 147 
and values – including mutual respect for state sovereignty - but for the purposes this chapter 148 
we can interpret the five principles of peaceful coexistence set out by Fidler (2013) as informal 149 
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institutions that operate in different ways alongside formal institutions in regional collaboration 150 
and international engagement. 151 
 152 
Neo-institutional theory stresses the importance of examining institutions, organisations and 153 
the actors within them and the ways these interact to shape policy and its practice. In public 154 
policy terms, formal institutions refer to official rule-setting and legal obligations with coercive 155 
mechanisms acting as the key driving force for action. They count as formal in terms of being: 156 
codified, official, purposefully designed and third party enforced. From this perspective, 157 
behaviour is constrained and regulated formally: organisations act in a certain way because 158 
they have to and not necessarily because they want to. Informal institutions describe values and 159 
norms that not only define goals or objectives but also designate ways to pursue them. We can 160 
call these informal on the grounds they are unofficial, uncodified, self-regulated and often 161 
emerge rather than being designed. Like formal institutions, they can impose constraints but 162 
also, at the same time, empower and enable social action.  163 
 164 
New institutionalism allows that formal and informal institutions may be misaligned in certain 165 
contexts, which not only produces confusion and conflict, but may also provide conditions that 166 
are highly likely to give rise to institutional change. In their summary of new institutionalism, 167 
Lowdnes and Roberts (2013) observe a dialectic relationship between the formal and informal 168 
aspects of institutions and place analytical importance on agency in the shaping, bending and 169 
challenging of institutional practices. An emphasis on the interactions and influences of 170 
different institutional norms, culture and actors within a broader context helps gain traction on 171 
the balance of informal and formal institutions in international policy coordination. 172 
 173 
A starting proposition for the study of international policy coordination is that political-174 
administrative jurisdictions tend to have fixed territorial limits/borders; and these are fixed 175 
even as the territorial scale of economic activity has changed both globally but also variety in 176 
some cases, at regional and urban and local scales. These changing economic geographies 177 
change carry attendant policy problems at those scales which are mismatched with the scales 178 
of political-administrative jurisdictions and national sovereignty as the basis of international 179 
policy cooridnation. 180 
 181 
Recent research has begun to uncover the role of informal governance in international policy-182 
making for such problems (e.g. Stone 2013, Kleine 2014). A precise definition of informal 183 
governance in terms of transboundary policy issues remains elusive, however at a minimum 184 
we can say it refers to the unwritten rules, strong norms and/or shared expectations within the 185 
international system that may modify, complement or substitute for formal institutions such as 186 
treaty provisions (Stone 2013). So defined, informalism is everywhere: both within formal 187 
international organizations (IOs), as well as operating separately as informal institutions, and 188 
in a broad array of international policy networks constituted by state and non-state actors. 189 
 190 
Importantly, whilst Stone (2013) argues that the informal may well complement or substitute 191 
for the formal, there remains an important possibility that has been neglected by current 192 
scholarship: a much more tense and problematic relationship where the formal can upset and 193 
even destroy informal institutions with severe and adverse consequences. For example, 194 
knowledge-based critiques of formal institutions argue that knowledge is necessarily 195 
fragmented and dispersed (and in large part tacit) which means that any attempt at ‘command 196 
and control’ or central planning is likely to be inimical to the informal because the ‘all knowing’ 197 
policy-maker and institutional designer is impossible. Conversely, and again ignored in the 198 
international governance literature, the work of Stinchcombe (2001) develops an argument in 199 
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favour of formalism: when a formal institution is designed to correct and update itself over 200 
time in response to feedback, it can be successful in adapting and learning formally about 201 
processes which are in essence informal. 202 
This chapter argues that it is in the different interactions between formal and informal 203 
interactions that we may explore the claim that national sovereignty undercuts effective 204 
international policy coordination. As noted, most institutionalist work in international policy 205 
tends to see the formal and informal as substitutable and existing in a coordinate relationship; 206 
for example, Stone (2013) describes the growing informality of international governance where 207 
non-state actors perform important functions in advocating for, implementing provisions 208 
within and reinforcing the legitimacy of formal treaty arrangements. In other literatures, the 209 
informal develops in the shadow of the formal, and a symbiotic relationship develops to ensure 210 
efficacy and stability of the formal.  211 
 212 
Background to case of international NCD prevention policy coordination in Asia 213 
An important feature of Asia’s rise in economic power has been trade liberalization, the 214 
systematic reduction in barriers to cross-border trade and investment. It has facilitated the 215 
development of the region’s advanced cross-border production networks that underlie its status 216 
as a ‘global industrial dynamo’ (Asian Development Bank 2011). In recent decades, and 217 
especially since the Asian financial crisis, trade liberalization has accelerated in both pace and 218 
scope through unilateral structural adjustment, accession to the multilateral (i.e. World Trade 219 
Organization) system, and more recently through the proliferation of a ‘noodle bowl’ of 220 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) at the bilateral and regional levels.  221 
Amongst its many social and economic consequences, trade liberalization has been identified 222 
with some large-scale negative effects on the health of Asian populations by facilitating the 223 
spread and growth of the region’s tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed2 food industries. 224 
Consumption of these commodities is rapidly increasing in the region, especially within the 225 
industrializing middle-income countries (Baker, Kay et al. 2014). Thus, by way of the 226 
commodities they produce, advertise and distribute, these industries have been identified as a 227 
key driver of the region’s rising burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), predominantly 228 
cardiovascular disease (CVD), cancer, diabetes and chronic respiratory diseases. NCDs are the 229 
leading causes of death and disability in Asia, accounting for 17 million or 65% of regional 230 
deaths in 2008 (Dans, Ng et al. 2011, Baker, Kay et al. 2014). Alongside still prevalent rates 231 
of infectious diseases, NCDs are generating considerable harms for Asian societies through 232 
costs to health systems, workforce productivity losses, and implications for poverty (Baker, 233 
Kay et al. 2014).  234 
Trade liberalization allows transnational risk commodity corporations (TRCCs) to move 235 
investments, technologies, production capacity, raw materials and final products more easily 236 
across borders and thereby drive risk commodity consumption transnationally (Baker, Kay et 237 
al. 2014). Attracted by their young and growing populations, burgeoning middle-class 238 
consumer base, and rapid economic growth rates TRCCs have increasingly targeted developing 239 
Asian markets. Although trade remains important, market penetration is primarily achieved 240 
through foreign direct investment (FDI) whereby TRCCs establish new affiliates or acquire 241 
complete or partial ownership of existing firms. Subsequently, FDI inflows are correlated with 242 
higher rates of risk commodity consumption and NCDs globally (Stuckler 2008). Among 243 
developing countries East Asia was the recipient of more net FDI inflows than any other region 244 
since 1990, equating to 64.5% of the world’s total in 2013 (World Bank 2014). Many countries 245 
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are also home to large state-owned risk commodity enterprises that compete with TRCCs, 246 
particularly in the tobacco sectors of China, Thailand and Vietnam (Barraclough and Morrow 247 
2010).  248 
A menu of policy instruments are available to regulate these industries and attenuate risk 249 
commodity consumption including raising product prices through taxation, marketing, 250 
promotion, and sponsorship restrictions, and product labelling controls (Magnusson and 251 
Patterson 2014). However, because trade agreements contain formal institutional rules about 252 
how markets are regulated they may constrict ‘domestic regulatory space’ or the ‘freedom, 253 
scope, and mechanisms available to governments to adopt, design and implement such 254 
regulations in the public health interest’ (Baker, Kay et al. 2014). The evolving global and 255 
regional trade regimes are likely, therefore, to influence risk commodity consumption and 256 
associated health risks in Asia. 257 
In order to apprehend more fully different dimensions of the relationship between formal and 258 
informal institutions and their consequences for international policy coordination, the next 259 
section sets out four distinctive patterns: informal institutions support formal institutions; 260 
informal institutions complement formal institutions; informal institutions undermine formal 261 
institutions; informal institutions coordinate formal institutions. These are neither a 262 
comprehensive set of relationships nor mutually exclusive sets, but instead offered as a means 263 
to explore the salient patterns of intersection and interaction between formal and informal 264 
institutions operating in international policy coordination. In doing so, we unpack some of the 265 
hidden drivers in the chapter’s initial argument that national sovereignty claims in Asia tend to 266 
undermine international policy coordination such as the existence of negative or positive 267 
feedbacks from the informal to the informal; and the relevant consistency issues between 268 
formal and institutions and the possibility is that informal institutions may operate at variance 269 
with formal institutional arrangements with the potential to undermine them or expand the 270 
scope of policy coordination beyond them. 271 
 272 
Informal institutions supporting formal institutions: prospects for NCD policy coordination in 273 
Asia 274 
At the multilateral, global governance level Asian nations are members of the two principal 275 
institutions governing health and trade respectively – the World Health Organization (WHO) 276 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regulations developed by these institutions are 277 
likely to be critical to future capacities to address trade in risk commodities and health in Asia. 278 
But the participation of Asian countries in other institutions whose functions spillover into 279 
health, including the UN General Assembly (UNGASS), Food and Agricultural Organization 280 
(FAO), Codex Alimentarius (Codex), World Bank, World Intellectual Property Organization 281 
(WIPO), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is also highly 282 
relevant (Smith, Lee et al. 2009). The capacity of this system to address trade in risk 283 
commodities in Asia is limited for several reasons. 284 
The first is the limited capacity of these institutions to develop, independently and in unison, 285 
effective regulations addressing trade in risk commodities. This stems at least partially from 286 
the divergent roles and powers of WHO and WTO. Although it has enabling constitutional 287 
powers to make legally-binding rules that could in principle regulate risk commodity trade, in 288 
practice WHO is a largely technical and normative agency that shapes national health policy 289 
through its power to convene national health ministries and to develop technical standards and 290 
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guidelines. The WTO in contrast institutionalises a set of binding trade rules (i.e. General 291 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequent WTO agreements) supported by 292 
enforcement panels, and engages more powerful ministries of finance and trade (Lee, Sridhar 293 
et al. 2009, Magnusson 2010). Provisions in GATT/WTO agreements designed to protect 294 
health (so-called ‘flexibilities’) have been interpreted very narrowly to date. Health is therefore 295 
subject to trade rules much more so than trade rules are subject to health regulations.  296 
There is, however, potential for Asian states to use informal institutions to strengthen policy 297 
capacity within the formal institutions of trade governance. Most Asian countries, as former 298 
members of the GATT, became members of the WTO upon its establishment in 1995. Others, 299 
concerned with the protection of domestic industries from foreign competition, proceeded with 300 
a more cautious approach to determining the depth and timing of trade liberalization, acceding 301 
to the WTO considerably later: China in 2001, Cambodia in 2004, Vietnam in 2007 and Laos 302 
in 2013 (Baker, Kay et al. 2014). Although the GATT/WTO agreements prohibit governments 303 
from adopting measures (policies and other regulations) that discriminate between foreign and 304 
domestic goods and investments, and between the goods and investments of different countries, 305 
trade restrictive measures are permitted if they are non-discriminatory, not used as disguised 306 
barriers to trade, and when the content of those measures is consistent with international 307 
standards including those developed by the WHO.  308 
In this regard, the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (adopted under 309 
Article 19 of the WHO constitution) is a legally binding treaty that can be used to uphold 310 
domestic tobacco legislation in trade disputes. This was exemplified recently in arguments used 311 
by Australia to defend its plain packaging legislation in response to WTO dispute arbitration 312 
and in a dispute bought by the tobacco company Philip Morris under the Hong Kong-Australia 313 
FTA (Commonwealth Government of Australia 2011). In this way, formal institutions can 314 
provide a legal mandate for Asian countries to protect domestic regulatory space to address 315 
risk commodities in trade disputes. However, developing informal institutions alongside the 316 
formal to help provide WHO with financial and political support to develop stronger 317 
multilateral risk commodity standards is a key potential opportunity for addressing risk 318 
commodities in the region. 319 
For ultra-processed foods and alcohol, however, standards comprise non-binding 320 
recommendations (adopted under Article 23), especially the 2004 Global Strategy on Diet, 321 
Physical Activity and Health, and 2010 Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol 322 
respectively. The former states that no provisions in the recommendations should be construed 323 
as justification for trade restrictive measures, while the latter recognizes the important role of 324 
trade as a determinant of alcohol consumption. The feasibility of and approaches for 325 
strengthening international standards to address ultra-processed foods and alcohol have been 326 
explored elsewhere, and may include the development of more selective mechanisms targeting 327 
particular products (e.g. soft drinks) or services (e.g. advertising) as well as standards set by 328 
other international organizations including Codex Alimentarius on food labelling, health 329 
claims and food composition (Magnusson 2007, Barraclough 2009).  330 
The second challenge concerns the power of Asian nations to influence the development of 331 
international standards. Some, such as Thailand and India played important supportive roles in 332 
the development of the FCTC. Their role in strengthening future risk commodity standards is, 333 
however, uncertain but likely to be constrained by several factors. Evidence suggests that Asian 334 
governments have engaged in global health negotiations in a largely state-centric and 335 
individualistic manner rather than through regional configurations (Lee, Pang et al. 2013). This 336 
reflects the commitment to state sovereignty discussed earlier and related lack of sense of 337 
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interdependence due to the diverse political and economic positions of the countries that may 338 
seek to act collectively in this regard. At present Asian governments also make relatively small 339 
contributions to the financing of multilateral organizations governing health and trade, likely 340 
to weaken their capacity to influence the respective agendas. A much improved understanding 341 
of the potential for Asian nations is needed in this regard, especially given that their increasing 342 
economic and political power is likely to lead to greater influence in global health and trade 343 
governance more generally (Lee, Kamradt‐Scott et al. 2012, Lee, Pang et al. 2013). 344 
Many Asian nations are also at a disadvantage in using WTO rules due to existing asymmetries 345 
in bargaining power and the resources available to nations to make or defend disputes. Of the 346 
26 WTO trade disputes made against Asian nations pertaining to agriculture, alcohol, tobacco 347 
and pharmaceuticals between 1996 and 2013, 21 were made by the United States (US) and 348 
European Community (EC) alone and of these 9 were against developing countries. Disputes 349 
pertaining to alcohol were most common. To the contrary only 5 claims were made by 350 
developing Asian countries against the US and EC (Baker, Kay et al. 2014). These difficulties 351 
are accentuated when the delegations of the US and EU countries are backed by deep-pocketed 352 
TRCC lobbyists and extensive legal teams (Shaffer 2003). 353 
Related to sovereignty and lack of sense of shared interests is that relative lack of programmatic 354 
capacity within the multilateral system in Asia. In 2006 the World Health Assembly adopted a 355 
resolution on trade and health, calling for engagement with trade policy-makers to ‘take 356 
advantage of the potential opportunities, and address the potential challenges that trade and 357 
trade agreements may have for health’. The WHO Global Action Plan for the Prevention and 358 
Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2013–2020 (GAPNCD) further recognizes the role of 359 
WHO in offering technical assistance to developing country governments to mitigate the 360 
impact of trade agreements on health. The GAPNCD also calls on the FAO to ‘Support 361 
ministries of agriculture in aligning agricultural, trade and health policies’ and on the WTO to 362 
‘…support ministries of trade in coordination with other competent government departments 363 
(especially those concerned with public health), to address the interface between trade policies 364 
and…noncommunicable diseases’ (World Health Organization 2013, p74). Such assistance 365 
may be critical to addressing the proliferation of risk commodity industries in Asia, especially 366 
in developing countries with limited institutional capacity.  367 
Some WHO programmes have been established to this end. A programme on globalisation, 368 
trade and health was initiated in 2000, ‘to strengthen knowledge, develop analytical methods, 369 
and produce training materials for supporting member states in addressing trade and health 370 
issues’. This led to some collaboration with WTO staff, including the production of a joint 371 
report on trade and health, although further commitments and activities have been vague (Lee, 372 
Sridhar et al. 2009). More recently this programme was merged into the WHO programme on 373 
global health diplomacy, which has produced a number of publications and offers executive 374 
training including on trade and health. Health diplomacy is likely to be a key force in achieving 375 
health and trade policy coherence for attenuating risk commodities, as it already has for access 376 
to medicines under the WTO’s TRIPs agreement (Aginam 2010). This includes building 377 
leadership capacity within the health community, and skills for advocating public health 378 
principles and methods in trade policy-making and implementation (Lee, Sridhar et al. 2009, 379 
Magnusson and Patterson 2014). WHO has, in the past, provided critical assistance to Asian 380 
governments during risk commodity trade disputes. For example Thailand successfully 381 
defended a 1990 GATT dispute, bought by the US Trade Representative on Thailand’s tobacco 382 
import restrictions, partly due to scientific evidence provided by WHO officials (Drope and 383 
Lencucha 2014). 384 
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The future of such programmes is uncertain, however. Political pressures from powerful donor 385 
countries, particularly from the US and EU countries which are home to some of the largest 386 
TRCCs (Lee, Sridhar et al. 2009), alongside increasing industry engagement (tobacco 387 
excepted), has led to reluctance from within WHO to tackle issues likely to cause 388 
confrontations with powerful industries (Lee, Sridhar et al. 2009, Magnusson and Patterson 389 
2011). WHO is also challenged by significant structural changes in global health governance 390 
(GHG) more broadly that weakens its capacity to govern responses to risk commodities. This 391 
includes the proliferation of new state and non-state actors in GHG, so-called ‘third-way 392 
norms’ and an expanded role for economic actors through public-private partnerships, 393 
philanthrocapitalism, and the financing / disciplinary power of international financial 394 
organizations. At present many of these actors, particularly the most powerful, give little 395 
priority to financing or supporting the prevention or control of NCDs (Sridhar and Batniji 396 
2008). More broadly, these contemporary changes in GHG significantly constrain the capacity 397 
of WHO and its regional offices in Asia (SEARO and WPRO), to enhance responses to risk 398 
commodities at the health-trade nexus.  399 
 400 
 401 
Informal institutions complementing formal institutions: trade rules and NCD prevention policy  402 
Notwithstanding the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the proliferation 403 
of bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in Asia,  alongside various 404 
investment provisions and treaties, is the salient feature international economic policy 405 
coordination (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2012). Trade 406 
negotiations within the multilateral system have stalled since the failed Doha Development 407 
Round in the mid-2000s and PTAs have provided an alternative institutional mechanism for 408 
high-income countries to achieve accelerated trade liberalization. Initial agreements may also 409 
trigger a domino effect as other countries initiate further PTAs to retain trade competitiveness 410 
(World Trade Organization 2011).  411 
Countries involved in PTA negotiations must comply with relevant WTO rules governing such 412 
agreements. This includes an ‘enabling clause’, permitting developing countries to protect 413 
certain sectors from liberalization and foreign competition. However, compared with the 414 
formal institutions of the international trading system, increasing regionalism creates 415 
significant challenges for regulating in the interests of public health. First, such PTAs are 416 
becoming increasingly ‘deep’ with commitments and concessions that go beyond those 417 
required by the WTO system (WTO-plus), but also those outside of it (WTO-X) (Friel, Gleeson 418 
et al. 2013, Baker, Kay et al. 2014). These are not so much concerned with facilitating trade 419 
but with removing ‘behind-the-border’ regulations that represent threats to global intra- and 420 
inter-firm supply chains. Four types of WTO-X provisions are most significant in recent PTAs: 421 
competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment liberalization and the movement of 422 
capital. These are the same issues ruled off the agenda by developing countries during the 423 
multilateral Doha Development Round, but are now common in PTAs led by developed 424 
countries, including the Trans Pacific Partnership currently under negotiation and involving a 425 
number of Asian countries (Friel, Gleeson et al. 2013).  426 
Further, while the multilateral system does provide aforementioned flexibilities on public 427 
health grounds these can be excluded from or highly restricted within PTAs. In the WTO 428 
system trade disputes are also made by one government against another, whereas the investor-429 
state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in many PTAs enable corporate investors to enact 430 
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proceedings directly against governments to recuperate losses resulting from the adoption of 431 
domestic regulations (including health regulations). Finally, PTA negotiations are usually 432 
‘closed door’, therefore lacking the greater transparency of multilateral negotiations and the 433 
checks-and-balances that come from closer scrutiny by civil society (Friel, Gleeson et al. 2013, 434 
Baker, Kay et al. 2014). These observations underpin the importance of Asian governments 435 
acting unilaterally and collectively to build informal institutions to protect regulatory space in 436 
such agreements. 437 
 438 
  439 
Informal institutions undermining formal institutions: the challenge of policy coherence in 440 
NCD prevention 441 
Growing economic integration in Asia brings the need for regional-level trade and health policy 442 
coherence. Yet in Asia, relative to the process of European integration, there has been an 443 
evolution of a hybrid mixture of formal and informal institutional arrangements that govern 444 
health and trade relations, reflecting the region’s economic, social and political diversity. In 445 
economic terms, for example, there is a 55-fold difference in Gross National Income (GNI) per 446 
capita (Atlas method) between Japan and Cambodia (World Bank 2014). Politically the region 447 
accommodates Marxist-Leninist Communism in Laos and Vietnam, unitary authoritarian 448 
parliamentary systems in Singapore and Indonesia, and the world’s largest parliamentary 449 
democracy in India. Unlike in the EU and North America, regional economic hegemony is also 450 
contested. This is evident in the two competing opportunities towards further regional 451 
economic integration, the first led by China, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 452 
Partnership (RCEP) involving the ASEAN+6 countries, the second involving the United States, 453 
the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) to which the TPP is a pre-cursor (Lewis 454 
2013). 455 
This institutional diversity in Asia creates particular challenges for collective action to address 456 
trade in risk commodities. Regional institutions governing trade include the Asia Pacific 457 
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Association of 458 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regional institutions governing health include ASEAN, 459 
and the offices of the World Health Organization (SEARO and WPRO) as well as bilateral 460 
agreements for health (Lee, Kamradt‐Scott et al. 2012, Fidler 2013). The effectiveness of these 461 
institutional arrangements in global and regional health governance has been variable. During 462 
negotiations of the FCTC for example, ASEAN and WHO regional offices served as important 463 
platforms for consolidating a regional position. These same organizations however, have been 464 
particularly ineffective at generating regional consensus in other areas including negotiations 465 
of the International Health Regulations and pandemic influenza response (Lee, Kamradt‐Scott 466 
et al. 2012).  467 
For historical reasons, WHO has divided East Asia into two regions, a significant challenge for 468 
building cohesion and co-ordination (Lamy and Phua 2012). Although WPRO is developing 469 
an evidence base to inform regional trade and health policies in the Pacific, neither SEARO 470 
nor WPRO appear to have engaged with the same topics in regards to Asia. Although ASEAN 471 
has played, at times, an important role in facilitating regional cooperation for health its role 472 
been relatively minor, and ASEAN health ASEAN Post-2015 Health Development Agenda 473 
exhibits the charactersitics described by Fidler (2013): the predominance of national 474 
sovereignty over collective action, a culture of consensus-building rather than open conflict, 475 
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and highly politicized decision-making processes. For example,m it remains problematic in the 476 
ASEAN Health cooperation that is that one of it key constituent members, Indonesia, is yet to 477 
ratify the FCTC. 478 
Despite the primacy they give to trade liberalization, ASEAN and APEC have recently 479 
demonstrated increased commitment to addressing regional health issues, in particular 480 
infectious disease threats (Lamy and Phua 2012). The ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting is 481 
held biennially, yet it has confined its work largely to infectious disease control and disaster 482 
preparedness, with agreements to date focused largely on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. 483 
However, in a joint statement in 2012, ASEAN+3 Health Ministers recognized the region’s 484 
growing NCD burden and affirmed their commitment to implementing the UN General 485 
Assembly’s Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable 486 
Diseases (Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2012). Actions to address NCDs have fallen 487 
under the ASEAN Strategic Framework on Health Development (2010-2015) with working 488 
groups established for regional tobacco control, but not ultra-processed foods or alcohol 489 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2012).  490 
The literature has yet to apprehend fully the potential for ASEAN and other regional bodies to 491 
constitute an effective platform for generating regional positions or informal institutions to 492 
address trade and risk commodities. Lamy and Phua (2012) have argued that increased 493 
cooperation on social issues through ASEAN, including health, is likely to strengthen its ‘soft 494 
power’ as a regional and global actor. However, weak financial commitments and human 495 
resource capacities may limit an ASEAN-led response. Such capacity could be buttressed by 496 
expanded technical collaboration between WHO and ASEAN, by achieving greater financial 497 
and technical commitments from China, Korea and Japan through the ASEAN+3 framework, 498 
and through stronger engagement with regional non-government organizations and epistemic 499 
communities working to address risk commodities (Lamy and Phua 2012). 500 
 501 
  502 
Coordinating formal and informal institutions: tobacco control as an exception 503 
In assessing the capacity of norms as informal institutions to contribute to health and trade 504 
policy coherence in Asia there are several relevant considerations. Health actors often view 505 
trade as a threat to population health, taking a ‘harm-minimisation’ approach, with little 506 
consideration for trade objectives. Trade actors, conversely, tend to view health as a barrier to 507 
trade with the objectives of reducing barriers to cross-border commercial flows and economic 508 
growth (Smith, Lee et al. 2009). Trade and health debates usually pivot, therefore, around 509 
norms of ‘anti-trade’ and ‘open-trade’. For example, between an international tobacco control 510 
norm on the one hand and open tobacco trade on the other (Drope and Lencucha 2014).  511 
Asian nations have differed considerably in how they have balanced the above norms as they 512 
relate to addressing risk commodities. For example, during the FCTC negotiations, Japan and 513 
China took steps to weaken the binding nature of adopted measures, making assertions of 514 
‘protecting sovereignty’. In contrast Thailand and India demonstrated considerable leadership 515 
in building regional consensus towards a strong tobacco control treaty, alongside their adoption 516 
of ‘enabling’ legislation at the national level. Thai delegates explicitly emphasised the need to 517 
achieve a strong treaty with provisions that take priority over trade rules (Lee, Kamradt‐Scott 518 
et al. 2012).  519 
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These observations tend to suggest that norm divergences serve to misalign informal 520 
institutions and thereby threaten the potential to undermine any collective action to coordinate 521 
policy on risk commodity control by Asian nations. Conversely, state sovereignty   has also 522 
been invoked in the public health interest: by India, Malaysia and Thailand to challenge 523 
intellectual property rules governing access to essential medicines, and by Indonesia to 524 
challenge perceived inequities in rules governing access to vaccines (Lee, Kamradt‐Scott et al. 525 
2012, Kamradt-Scott, Lee et al. 2013). Although these are different issues strong assertions of 526 
sovereignty may have, therefore, potential utility when it comes to protecting domestic policy 527 
space for risk commodity control. Overcoming anti-trade vs. open-trade debates is also another 528 
path forward. Such debates often ignore the potential for trade agreements to promote health. 529 
The liberalization of the tobacco sector, for example, could potentially result in the dismantling 530 
of powerful state-owned enterprises SOEs thereby removing the conflict of interest arising 531 
from the state as both producer and regulator (although admittedly to be replaced by TRCCs) 532 
(McGrady 2011).  533 
The future: Emerging Asian varieties of international policy coordination 534 
 535 
The chapter has explored the argument that assertions of national sovereignty and the primacy 536 
of formal national level political institutions in policy-making tends generally to undermine 537 
international policy coordination in Asia. The NCD prevention policy case presents some 538 
suggestions that there is greater international policy coordination capacity in Asia than this 539 
argument implies. In addition to challenging the scholarly utility of an ideal type dichotomy in 540 
international policy coordination of the EU and Eastphalian models in which the latter is seen 541 
as an immature and weaker version of the former, this case study casts light on the importance 542 
of informal institutions and their intersection and articulation with formal institutions in 543 
international policy coordination. This latter insight is developed conceptually in the chapter 544 
through sketching some possible simple relationships between formal and informal institutions. 545 
For example, increasing participation in international trade agreements requires countries to 546 
strengthen their domestic policy capacity; to evaluate the costs and benefits of entering into 547 
trade agreements; to ensure compliance with their international obligations when they do; and 548 
to ensure adequate protections for domestic regulatory space (Walls, Smith et al. , Baker, Kay 549 
et al. 2014). This is a significant challenge especially for poorer countries that may struggle to 550 
develop the required scientific and legal expertise, as well as formal institutional capacity. 551 
However, networks of informal institutions operation across Asia, such as technical support 552 
and mutual capacity-building, are important in supporting the functioning of formal 553 
institutions.  554 
Options identified by the WHO for attenuating risk commodity consumption include raising 555 
product prices through taxation, restrictions on product marketing, promotion, and sponsorship, 556 
and product labelling controls (Magnusson and Patterson 2014). This necessitates informal 557 
institutions to establish collaboration between health and trade policy-makers to protect policy 558 
space in future trade agreements (Thow and McGrady 2014). By reducing tariff revenues and 559 
imposing significant costs associated with compliance and negotiation, trade agreements may 560 
also reduce the resources available to governments used to fund policies and programmes to 561 
address risk commodities. Consumption taxes are a key strategy for off-setting such losses, and 562 
can therefore be adopted for both revenue-raising as well as public health reasons.  563 
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In public health policy terms, Asia is also home to exemplary countries that have sought to 564 
advance public health through staunch assertions of national sovereignty through unilateral, 565 
and uncoordinated, regulation their domestic markets. Thailand, for example, has one of the 566 
most comprehensive tobacco control regimes globally (Chantornvong and McCargo 2001). It 567 
has implemented a hypothecated 2% tax on alcohol and tobacco to fund its Thai Health 568 
Promotion Foundation (Casswell and Thamarangsi 2009). The re-regulation of risk commodity 569 
markets policy option is a key consideration for governments that have already liberalized the 570 
relevant sectors; this requires the development of informal institutions around formal 571 
institutions of trade agreements. For example, Thailand is a world leader in establishing novel 572 
informal institutional designs for public health with trade agreements. Its Trade in Health and 573 
Social Services committee, for example, brings together officials from ministries of industry, 574 
public health, food and agriculture, as well as various professional groups to investigate how 575 
trade agreements effect health, to advocate for the inclusion of health in trade negotiations, and 576 
to coordinate action between concerned agencies (Smith, Lee et al. 2009).  577 
Although the health sector was selected for investigation as a typical case of international 578 
policy coordination challenges, it is moot whether the details of the NCD prevention policy 579 
explored here is generalizable directly to other policy sectors. However, it is hoped that the 580 
sketch of basic and potential intersections and articulations between formal and informal will 581 
help public policy scholars begin to apprehend the variegated patterns, processes and practices 582 
of international policy coordination in Asia across different sectors. 583 
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